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MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR
COMMUNITY SERVICE PROBATIONERS
Dennis Huffer, Legal Consultant
Sid Hemsley, Senior Legal Consultant
Introduction
Legislation in many states authorizes adult 
and juvenile courts to sentence offenders to 
perform community service as a condition of 
probation. Generally, such legislation permits local 
governments (and in some cases, private agencies) 
to use probationers in a variety of public service 
jobs. Community service probationer programs 
have generated questions about the liability 
of local governments for injuries caused and 
suffered by probationers performing work under 
their supervision. State legislation governing that 
liability is generally limited to the application of 
tort liability and workers’ compensation laws to such 
offenders. But 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is another possible 
avenue of liability. This report will consider what 
potential liabilities local governments in Tennessee 
face when they use probationers to perform 
community service.
Statutory Law Governing Community 
Service by Probationers in Tennessee
Under Tennessee Code Annotated (T.C.A.),
Title 41, Chapter 9, defendants eligible for
probation1 may be ordered to perform community 
service as a condition of probation.2 Probationers 
may be assigned to the Tennessee Department of 
Correction (T.C.A. 41-9-101 et seq.) or to the county 
probation department (T.C.A. 41-9-201 et seq.) to 
perform approved community work projects. In 
both cases, the local government is insulated from 
liability for injuries suffered, or caused by, the 
community service probationer while he or she
is performing community service work, if the
local government “exercised due care in the 
protection and supervision of such probationer” 
(T.C.A. 41-9-104 and 41-9-204).3 However, 
that insulation is no greater than is already 
provided local governments under the Tennessee 
Governmental Tort Liability Act.
Local Government Tort Liability 
for Injuries Caused by Community 
Service Probationers
The Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act 
(TGTLA) stripped local government of immunity 
from tort suits in several areas. Under that act, 
local governments are now liable for injuries
arising from the negligent operation of motor 
vehicles by their employees (T.C.A. 29-20-202), 
unsafe streets and highways (T.C.A. 29-20-203), 
dangerous structures (T.C.A. 29-20-204), and
the negligent acts or omissions of their employees
(except for injuries arising from the performance
of discretionary functions, false arrest and several
other intentional torts, issuance and revocation
of permits, inspections of property, judicial
and administrative prosecutions, employee 
misrepresentations, riots and other disorders,
and the levy and collection of taxes)
(T.C.A. 29-20-205). The TGTLA provides that the act 
is the exclusive route for a tort liability suit against 
a local government (T.C.A. 29-20-101 et seq.).
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The most likely source of local government tort 
liability for injuries caused by a community service 
probationer is the negligent acts or omissions of 
its employees (T.C.A. 29-20-205). But the local 
government cannot be reached directly through 
the conduct of the community service probationer 
because the latter is not a local government 
employee. The definition of “employee” in the
act provides that any person, other than an
elected or appointed official or member of a board, 
is an employee if the person meets all of the 
following requirements:
• The governmental entity itself selected
 the person in question to perform services;
• The governmental entity is liable for the
 payment of compensation for the
 performance of such services, and the
 person receives all of his compensation
 directly from the payroll department of the
 governmental entity;
• The governmental entity provides the
 person in question the same benefits as
 all other employees of the governmental
 entity, including retirement benefits
 and the eligibility to participate in
 insurance programs;
• The person acts under the control and
 direction of the governmental entity not
 only as to the result to be accomplished
 but as to the means and details by which
 which the result is accomplished; and
• The person is entitled to the same job
 protection system and rules, such as
 civil service or grievance procedures,
 as are other persons employed by
 the governmental entity
 (T.C.A. 29-20-107(a)[1]-[5]).
That narrow definition appears to conclusively 
exclude either adult or juvenile community service 
probationers. It would be extremely difficult for 
anyone claiming injury at the hands of a community 
service probationer to show that an employer-
employee relationship existed between the local 
government and the community service probationer. 
While local governments apply for the use of 
probationers to perform community service, they 
probably do not “select” them to perform services 
within the meaning of the TGTLA; the selection
is done by the Tennessee Department of
Correction or the county probation department
(T.C.A. 41-9-104 and 41-9-204). In fact, as its 
title implies and its contents make clear, the 
Community Service Participation Agreement With 
Supervising Agency (See Appendix A) which the local 
government must sign as a condition to obtaining 
probationers from the Department of Correction 
to perform community service, imposes extensive 
supervisory, but no selection, responsibilities on the 
local government. There are no local governments 
in Tennessee that compensate community service 
probationers or provide them with the same
benefits and job protection they provide to their 
regular employees.
An even further limitation on the definition of an 
employee for the purposes of the TGTLA permits 
a local government to use and direct the labor of 
community service probationers without the danger 
of creating an employer-employee relationship. 
T.C.A. 29-20-107(b) provides that:
A governmental entity’s reservation of the
right to approve employment or terminate
employment by any contract, agreement or 
other means or such entity’s ability to control 
or direct a person not otherwise in the regular 
employ of such entity shall not operate to 
make a person an employee of such entity for 
the purpose of the immunity granted by this 
chapter unless such person otherwise qualifies 
as an employee according to the provisions of 
this section.
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However, the fact that community service 
probationers are not employees within the meaning 
of TGTLA should not lull local governments into a 
false sense of security. Negligent acts and omissions 
of local government employees for which local 
governments are liable under that act undoubtedly 
include negligent supervision. A person claiming 
injury at the hands of a community service 
probationer could sue the local government on
the grounds that the failure of the local 
government’s employees to adequately supervise 
the community service probationer was the cause 
of the injury. That person would be aided by both 
T.C.A., Title 41, Chapter 9, and the Tennessee 
Department of Correction Community Service 
Participation Agreement with Supervising Agency. 
T.C.A., Title 41, Chapter 9, in a left-handed fashion, 
creates a statutory duty on the part of local 
governments to protect and supervise community 
service probationers. The Agreement, in clear and 
unmistakable terms, thrusts the responsibility 
for their protection and supervision on the user. 
The user agrees, among other things, to accept 
complete responsibility for “All supervision of every 
defendant who does work for my agency through 
this agreement” (Paragraph 2). In addition, the 
Agreement provides that:
IN CONSIDERATION, for participating in the
Work Project Program, the supervising
agency accepts full responsibility for the
supervision of all defendants assigned to the 
agency. Should the supervising agency desire 
to be insured against any risk associated with 
the program, it is the supervising agency’s 
responsibility to obtain and pay for such 
insurance coverage.
Other provisions in the Agreement give written 
notice to local governments that community service 
probationers can represent supervisory problems. 
That notice probably creates a correspondingly 
high supervisory duty on the part of the local 
government (especially Paragraph 10), a duty that is 
easy to carelessly breach.
But what about the insulation from liability given 
to local governments which use community service 
probationers under T.C.A., Title 41, Chapter 9? That 
insulation is triggered only if the local government 
exercised “due care” in the protection and 
supervision of the community service probationer. 
Under Tennessee tort law, “due care” and “ordinary 
care” are synonymous, and the lack of due (ordinary) 
care, under the circumstances, is negligence.4
The same standard for measuring whether the 
conduct of local government employees is
negligent applies to the TGTLA; therefore,
 T.C.A., Title 41, Chapter 9, offers local governments 
no more insulation against claims of injuries 
suffered at the hands of community service 
probationers than they already have under the 
TGTLA. Any insulation T.C.A., Title 41, Chapter 9, 
appears to create is an illusion.
Local government employees using community 
service probationers have written notice of their 
supervisory and protective responsibilities under 
T.C.A., Title 41, Chapter 9, and the Community 
Service Participation Agreement with Supervising 
Agency. But the Agreement also provides local 
government employees written notice of something 
their common experience and good sense should 
have already told them: Some of the probationers 
may not be upstanding citizens. Due or ordinary 
care under those circumstances probably dictates a 
higher duty on the part of the local government’s 
employees to supervise and protect them than they 
would generally have with respect to other classes 
of persons, including fellow employees.
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Tort Liability for Injuries to 
Community Service Probationers
Because community service probationers are not 
employees, local governments responsible for their 
control and supervision could be held liable under 
the TGTLA for injuries probationers suffer in the 
performance of community service work. There 
appears to be nothing in that act that provides 
local governments any more protection against 
claims of injury from such persons than they have 
against similar claims from members of the general 
public. In fact, T.C.A., Title 41, Chapter 9, gives the 
community service probationer the advantage of 
a statute that points to a duty on the part of the 
local government to supervise and protect him
from injury.
An additional source of duty to protect the 
community service offender is the Department 
of Correction Community Service Participation 
Agreement with Supervising Agency. The previous 
section demonstrated that a local government 
signing that agreement accepts written 
responsibility for the supervision of community 
service probationers. Some of the provisions of that 
agreement also impose a responsibility on the local 
government to protect them. Everything considered, 
the agreement is arguably more concerned with 
their protection than with injuries they may cause 
third parties. The participating agency has the 
responsibility, among other things, for “Seeing that 
all supervisors require defendants to wear safety 
devices as the situation may require” (Paragraph 7), 
and “Seeing that no task which would reasonably 
endanger the life or safety of the defendant is 
assigned to any defendant” (Paragraph 8).
The most likely sources of liability under the act 
for injuries to community service probationers 
are negligent acts or omissions of the local 
government’s employees (T.C.A. 29-20-205) and the 
negligent operation of a motor vehicle by the local 
government’s employees (T.C.A. 29-20-202).
For example, a community service probationer 
injured by a wrench carelessly dropped on his foot, 
or in a traffic accident in a vehicle driven by a 
local government employee, could sue the local 
government under the TGTLA the same as any other 
member of the general public.
Under T.C.A., Title 41, Chapter 9, a local government 
is not liable for injuries caused or suffered by 
a community service probationer as long as 
it exercises “due care” in the supervision and 
protection of the probationer. But as the previous 
section pointed out, “due care” is the same
ordinary negligence standard that applies to the 
TGTLA. T.C.A., Title 41, Chapter 9 provides no 
additional protection to the local government 
defending the suit brought by the community 
service probationer injured by the dropped wrench 
or in the traffic accident.
A community service probationer injured while 
performing community service work for a local 
government enjoys a peculiar advantage over a local 
government employee injured in the performance 
of his job: The probationer may recover under 
the TGTLA while the employee may recover only 
under the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Law. 
As the next section points out, the community 
service probationer’s recovery under the TGTLA 
may significantly exceed the municipal employee’s 
recovery under the Workers’ Compensation Act, even 
for identical injuries. But an advantage the employee 
enjoys under the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation 
Act is that his own negligence causing or contribut-
ing to the injury will not bar his recovery. The 
community service probationer’s own negligence 
causing or contributing to his injury may, in some 
circumstances, bar his recovery under the TGTLA.
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Workers’ Compensation Liability for 
the Community Service Probationer
Recovery by community service probationers under 
the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act
(T.C.A. 50-6-101 et seq.) for injuries sustained 
in the performance of community service work 
is apparently foreclosed by that law’s definition 
of an employee. T.C.A. 50-6-102(2)(a) defines 
an “employee” for the purpose of worker’s 
compensation coverage as:
Every person, including a minor, whether 
lawfully or unlawfully employed, the 
president, any vice-president, secretary, 
treasurer, or other executive officer of
a corporate employer without regard to 
the nature of the duties of such corporate 
officials, in the service of an employer, as 
employer is defined in subdivision (a)(3), 
under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, 
written or implied… 
The key to the above definition is the phrase
“under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, 
written or implied…” There is no contract of
hire or apprenticeship in the local government-
community service probationer relationship. In
a 1978 opinion, the California Office of the Attorney 
General opined that an adult criminal defendant who 
elects to perform community service in exchange 
for probation in lieu of being jailed or fined, has 
the status of a “volunteer” for the purposes of 
California’s Workers’ Compensation Law. Community 
service probationers in Tennessee probably have 
the same status. They may not be volunteers in the 
traditional sense, but they “volunteer” to perform 
community service in lieu of other sentencing 
alternatives open to them. The question whether
a volunteer was an employee for Tennessee Workers’ 
Compensation Law purposes arose in Hill v. King, 663 
S.W. 2d 435 (Tenn. App. 1983). In that case
a deputy sheriff was killed in the crash of an 
airplane piloted by the Robertson County Sheriff 
while they were transporting a prisoner from West 
Virginia to Robertson County. The deputy’s survivors 
sued the sheriff personally, Robertson County, and 
an aviation company on various grounds. However, 
the issue in this case was the suit against Robertson 
County on the alternative grounds that the deputy 
was entitled to compensation under the TGTLA, 
or under the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation 
Law. The deputy’s survivors appealed the trial 
court’s decision that the deputy was an employee 
of Robertson County within the meaning of the 
Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Law. The reason 
they objected to the trial court’s decision is that, 
in Tennessee, the Workers’ Compensation Law is 
the exclusive remedy of an employee against an 
employer for on-the-job injuries. If the trial court’s 
ruling stood, the right of his survivors to claim
a more generous recovery under the TGTLA would
be extinguished.
In discussing the relationship between the
deputy and Robertson County, the Court of Appeals 
found that:
The deceased sustained a unique relationship 
with Dan King, Sheriff of Robertson County. 
He had been commissioned a deputy sheriff, 
had received a pistol and uniform, and was 
authorized to serve, process, and transport 
prisoners. Each employee of the sheriff was 
permitted to eat one meal at the jail during 
each tour of duty… Deceased occasionally 
ate at the jail while on duty. He was paid no 
salary, could work as much or as little as he 
chose, and even when scheduled to work, he 
was not obliged to report for duty. He was 
reimbursed for fuel used and expenses incurred 
on official business. He did regularly report 
to work; and, when he did, he was subject to 
orders exactly as other salaried officers were.
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That relationship did not make the deputy an 
employee within the meaning of the Workers’ 
Compensation Law, held the Tennessee Court of 
Appeals. The deputy was, “not for hire;” he had 
not entered into an “agreement for pay.” Absent 
the agreement for hire, even if he got occasional 
benefits as an employee, he did not give up his 
rights under the common law or the TGTLA. As to 
the limited benefits the deputy received, the
court said:
It is possible that a court might stretch 
the occasional meal to represent ‘hire’ if 
the question were whether or not workers’ 
compensation were due although this is 
extremely doubtful. However, … to impute 
or imply a waiver of so serious a right as the 
common law to recover full compensation or 
the statutory right to recover within the limits 
of the Governmental Tort Liability Act, there 
must be such real, palpable and substantial 
consideration (hire) as would be expected 
to induce a reasonable man to give up such 
valuable rights. In other words, the law will 
not presume that Mr. King sold his birthright 
for a mess of pottage.
The “mess of pottage” was the relatively small
death benefit payable to the deputy’s survivors 
under the Workers’ Compensation Law compared
to the deputy’s “birthright,” the benefits payable 
under the TGTLA. While the task will not be 
undertaken here, a comparison of the Workers’ 
Compensation Law’s schedule of benefits and the 
damages recovered under the TGTLA will bring
to mind a variety of circumstances under which
a community service probationer is eligible for
a recovery substantially greater than is a comparably 
injured local government employee. The community 
service offender is no more likely than the volunteer 
deputy sheriff to give up “his birthright for a mess 
of pottage.”
If the deputy sheriff in Hill was not an employee
for Workers’ Compensation purposes, it is
unlikely that a “volunteer” community service 
probationer is an employee, even if he receives
his meals on the job or other minor incidental 
employee benefits.
Even if the argument is accepted that a community 
service probationer is not a volunteer, that he was 
coerced to perform community service, it would still 
be difficult for him to claim that he is an employee 
for workers’ compensation purposes. In the case of 
Abram v. Madison County Highway Department, 495 
S.W.2d 539 (1973) the Tennessee Supreme Court
held that a prisoner performing compulsory labor 
for the county was not an employee within the 
meaning of the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation 
Law because his labor was involuntary; he had not 
bargained for employment.
In other words, a community service offender is not 
an employee within the meaning of the Tennessee 
Workers’ Compensation Law whether he is or is not 
a volunteer. In neither case has he bargained for 
employment or entered a contract for hire.
Section 1983 Liability for
the Conduct of Community
Service Offenders
While the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act 
is the exclusive route for a tort liability suit against 
a local government under Tennessee law, a person 
claiming injury arising from the violation of his
civil rights by a local government may sue that 
government in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
Section 1983, as it is commonly called, provides 
simply that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, 
of any State or territory or the District of 
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, 
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any citizen of the United States or other 
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress.
Since 1978, municipalities have been “persons” 
within the meaning of Section 1983. They have 
frequently been held liable for the conduct of their 
employees, and a few times for the conduct of non-
employees under their control, when such conduct 
resulted in the deprivation of a third party’s civil 
rights. As far as can be determined, no local 
government has been held liable under Section 1983 
for the conduct of a community service probationer, 
but Section 1983 is broad enough to include such 
liability under the right circumstances.
It is not difficult to imagine the right circumstances 
involving community service probationers following 
the case of Nishiyama v. Dickson County, Tennessee, 
814 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1987).5 There the U.S. Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a county could 
be held liable under Section 1983 for the murder 
of a sixteen year old girl by a jail trusty. The facts 
in that case reflect incredibly poor judgment on 
the part of the sheriff and his deputy in exercising 
supervision and control over the trusty. They also 
illustrate how easy it is for poor judgment to be 
exercised “under color of statute,” and to become 
government policy or custom resulting in the 
deprivation of constitutional rights for which the 
local government can be held liable.
The Sheriff of Dickson County, Tennessee 
accepted custody of Charles Hartman, a convicted 
burglar, sent to Dickson County by the Tennessee 
Department of Correction under a Tennessee statute 
that permits counties to contract with the state to 
house nondangerous felons (T.C.A. 41-8-101 et seq.). 
However, the court of Appeals declared that the 
sheriff and his deputy “were on notice that Hartman 
was dangerous and had assaulted a young woman in 
the past,” and that in the face of that knowledge,6 
they gave him frequent unsupervised use of marked 
sheriff’s department patrol cars fully equipped with 
lights and siren. Hartman used the patrol car to 
perform official tasks for the sheriff and another 
deputy and for personal tasks.
On one occasion Hartman, under orders of the 
deputy, drove the latter to the deputy’s farm several 
miles from the Dickson County jail. Hartman did not 
reappear at the Dickson County jail until ten hours 
later. During his absence he roamed the highways 
of Dickson, Houston and Montgomery counties and 
stopped several motorists, using the patrol car’s 
blue lights. One of the motorists he stopped was 
an unfortunate 16-year-old girl whom he kidnapped 
and murdered. At one point the Montgomery County 
Sheriff’s office learned that a Dickson County 
sheriff’s car was stopping motorists in Montgomery 
County and reported that information to the Dickson 
County dispatcher.
The court held that the practice of the sheriff and 
his deputy of providing Hartman with a clearly 
marked sheriff’s patrol car was action taken under 
color of state law, and that:
The defendant’s actions cannot be attributed 
to simple inattention or carelessness. Rather, 
the defendants consciously established
a policy of allowing trusties to have use of 
official patrol cars with seeming indifference 
to consequences. The defendants consciously 
and voluntarily failed to respond to the
danger presented by Hartman’s use of the car 
to stop motorists.
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Such “reckless indifference to the risk posed by 
their action” was sufficient to state a claim of 
action under Section 1983, said the court.
Generally, cases in which local governments have 
been held liable for the conduct of their employees 
and non-employees under their control turn upon 
the ability of the courts to find one or more hiring, 
screening, training, supervisory and disciplinary 
practices so negligently bad, that the negligence 
rises to the level of deliberate unconstitutional 
policy or custom on the part of the local 
government. Nishiyama demonstrates that the courts 
have shown a high degree of ability to find such 
practices on the part of local governments.
Both the Tennessee Department of Correction and 
the county probation department have an obligation 
to screen candidates for community service work, 
and to regularly inspect each work project to 
ensure that the probationer is being properly used 
(T.C.A. 41-9-101 and 41-9-201). However, Nishiyama 
turned in part on the court’s view that the sheriff 
of Dickson County had notice that Hartman was 
a dangerous person even though the sheriff only 
accepted custody of him from the Tennessee 
Department of Correction. That case should warn 
local governments that, for purposes of Section 
1983 liability, they cannot rely on the screening 
of probationers by the Tennessee Department of 
Correction or the county probation department. 
Local governments may only accept, rather than 
select, community service probationers to perform 
work projects under T.C.A., Title 41, Chapter 9, 
but the responsibility for determining whom they 
have accepted remains in their hands. Every local 
government should independently and carefully 
screen (and in appropriate cases, reject) every 
prospective community service probationer. Many of 
them will be relatively minor offenders, but others 
may, like Hartman, be ticking time bombs.
Local governments that use community service 
probationers should take seriously the supervisory 
requirements the Community Service Participation 
Agreement with Supervising Agency imposes on 
them, including the record keeping and reporting 
requirements. A poor record in this area will be used 
against the local government, both by a person 
claiming injury by a community service probationer 
and by a community service probationer claiming 
injury. In either case, poor record keeping may be 
evidence of inadequate supervision and protection 
of the community service probationer.
Some local governments attempt to reduce 
the liability risks in the community service 
probationer program by requiring community 
service probationers to sign a waiver of claims 
before starting to work. Generally, by signing 
such a waiver, the community service probationer 
releases the local government from all claims for 
injuries or damages the probationer may suffer while 
performing community service work. There are two 
serious problems with such waivers.
First, it is questionable whether an “exculpatory 
contract” executed by a community service 
probationer is enforceable. Even if the community 
service probationer is a volunteer, it is the coercive 
power of the court to jail or fine the defendant 
which leads him to “volunteer” for community 
service as a condition of probation. The community 
service probationer is in a severely unequal 
bargaining position respecting his labor.
Oddly enough, the same lack of “bargaining for hire”
that defeats any claim that the community service 
probationer is an employee, may make such a 
waiver unenforceable as a matter of public policy. 
(See Olsen v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429 [Tenn. 1977]). 
Even if that barrier is jumped, the left-handed 
statutory duty local governments owe under 
T.C.A., Title 41, Chapter 9, to use “due care” in the 
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protection and supervision of community service 
probationers might override any waiver signed by 
the probationer.
Second, the waiver cannot be made effective 
against a person suing the local government under 
the TGTLA or Section 1983 for injury at the hands 
of a community service probationer. The best that 
a waiver could do is waive the community service 
probationer’s claims against the local government.
It is obvious that no matter what the source of 
potential liability of the local government in the 
use of community service probationers, the local 
government can minimize the risk of liability by 
using caution in screening them; assigning them to 
jobs in which the potential for injury to them and 
to others is small; adopting and enforcing clear, 
written policies governing the scope and conditions 
of their labor and their relations with the public and 
employees; and closely supervising and protecting 
them. The local government should also contact 
its insurance carrier to determine the extent of its 
coverage for injuries caused by and to community 
service probationers.
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APPENDIX A
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION – DIVISION OF PROBATION
COMMUNITY SERVICE PARTICIPATION
AGREEMENT WITH SUPERVISING AGENCY*
THE UNDERSIGNED AGENCY HAS AGREED WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE COMMUNITY SERVICE PROGRAM 
IN EXCHANGE FOR LABOR TO BE DONE FOR THE AGENCY AT NO COST TO THE AGENCY. ANY FAILURE BY THE AGENCY TO COMPLY WITH THE ORDERS, 
RULES OR REGULATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION MAY RESULT IN IMMEDIATE TERMINATION OF THE AGENCY FROM THE PROGAM. THE 
FOLLOWING IS EXPRESSLY UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED:
 1. I,  __________  , as the representative of the supervising agency participating in the Work Project Program understand that I am 
responsible for:
 2. All supervision of every defendant who does work for my agency through this program;
 3. For all records required by the coordinator;
 4. Making sure that the supervisor’s log and the defendant’s time sheet are kept on a daily basis;
 5. Seeing that injuries incurred with defendants are reported immediately to the coordinator;
 6. Notifying all supervisors working with defendants that any supervisor falsifying any records or showing favoritism toward any 
defendant could result in termination from the program;
 7. Seeing that all supervisors require defendants to wear safety devices as a situation may require;
 8. Seeing that no task which would reasonably endanger the life or safety of the defendant is assigned to any defendant;
 9. Seeing that appropriate work receipts are issued at the end of each day to each defendant and appropriate duplicates are maintained 
for the defendants;
10. Seeing that any problems from defendants are reported immediately to the coordinator. Such problems may include, but are not 
limited to: (a) uncooperativeness, (b) tardiness, (c) possession of any weapon, (d) possession or use of any narcotics, alcohol or 
drugs, (e) use of profanity, (f) dangerous horseplay;
IN CONSIDERATION, for participating in the Work Project Program the supervising agency accepts full responsibility for the 
supervision of all defendants assigned to the agency. Should the supervising agency desire to be insured against any risk associated with the 
program, it is the supervising agency’s responsibility to obtain and pay for such insurance coverage.
The undersigned individual, signing in behalf of the supervising agency, hereby acknowledges that I have the authority to bind 
the supervising agency to the terms of the agreement; I agree to abide by the terms of this agreement; the agreement has been adequately 
explained to me; I understand the full consequences if the agency should not comply with this agreement; and I acknowledge receiving a copy 
of this agreement.
SUPERVISING AGENCY:                    
BY:                               
DATE: 
COORDINATOR:                       
*This is a reproduction. Contact Department of Correction, Division of Probation for original.
ENDNOTES
1. Under T.C.A., Section 40-35-303, a defendant is 
eligible for probation if the sentence imposed is 
eight (8) years or less, with some exceptions for 
certain crimes [1989 Criminal Sentencing
 Reform Act].
2. There is probably no authority under Tennessee 
law for a municipal court to “sentence” ordinance 
violators to community service as a condition 
of probation or for that matter, even to put 
municipal ordinance violators on probation.
 Note: Since this report was first published in 
1989, The General Assembly has authorized 
municipal offenders (T.C.A. 41-3-107) and 
juvenile offenders (T.C.A. 37-1-131(a)(7)) to 
be sentenced to community service work. 
These statutes provide the municipality using 
municipal and juvenile offenders the same 
immunity discussed in the body of this report 
that applies to the use of probationers.
3.  T.C.A. 41-9-104, which applies to probationers 
supervised by the Tennessee Department
     of Correction, insulates charitable
     organizations and governmental entities 
authorized to utilize probationer labor under
     T.C.A. 41-9-102. T.C.A. 41-9-102(a) authorizes 
“any charitable organization or governmental 
entity within a judicial circuit” to utilize 
such labor. That authority, standing alone, 
undoubtedly includes municipalities within 
the judicial circuit. But T.C.A. 41-9-102(c) 
also provides that any qualified charitable 
organization, or “any agency, branch, 
department or other entity of municipal, county 
or state government” may apply to the project 
coordinator of the judicial circuit where the work 
project is to be performed for probationer labor.
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T.C.A. 41-9-204, which applies to probationers 
supervised by the county probation department, 
in similar language insulates charitable 
organizations, and, specifically, municipalities, 
counties and political subdivisions authorized
by T.C.A. 41-9-102 to utilize probationer labor.
4. See Street v. National Broadcasting Company, 
512 F.Supp. 398 (E.D.Tenn. 1977). Also see 19 
TENNESSEE JURISPRUDUENCE, Negligence, see. 2.
If T.C.A. Title 41, Chapter 9, creates a statutory 
duty on the part of local governments to protect 
and supervise community service probationers, 
the breach of that duty may also constitute 
negligence per se.
5. Since this report was first published in 1989, 
court rulings have undermined the basis for the 
decision in Nishiyama. It is not clear, however, 
whether a different result would be dictated by 
these later cases. It is clear that the issues in 
Nishiyama would have to be analyzed under a 
different constitutional standard today. Applying 
a different standard does not guarantee a 
different result, especially given the egregious 
facts in the case.
After the Sixth Circuit decided Nishiyama, 
the U.S. Supreme Court decided Deshaney v. 
Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 
489 U.S. 189, 109 S. Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed. 2d 249 
(1989) and Collins v. City of Harker Heights,
503 U.S. 115, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed. 2d 261 
(1992). These cases stand for the proposition 
that negligence or gross negligence–similar to 
that relied on in Nishiyama–would not now be 
enough to create government liability under the 
Due Process Clause. DeShaney involved a father 
who beat his child until the child suffered brain 
damage and became profoundly retarded. The 
workers in the Department of Social Services 
failed to protect the child. The court held:
[N]othing in the language of the Due Process 
Clause itself requires the State to protect 
the life, liberty, and property of its citizens 
against private actors. 489 U.S. 195.
Harker Heights involved a city worker who was 
asphyxiated after going into a sewer. His widow 
charged that the city failed to train him on 
the dangers of sewers. The court held that the 
Due Process Clause does not create a duty to 
provide a safe workplace and reiterated part of 
the reasoning in DeShaney that the Due Process 
Clause was intended to prevent the government 
from abusing its power and using it as an 
instrument of oppression.
In Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856
(6th Cir. 1997), the Sixth Circuit tried to explain 
what the present standard for liability is under 
the substantive Due Process Clause. According 
to the court, intentional infliction of injury 
by the government or government action 
that is arbitrary in the constitutional sense 
is necessary. What action is arbitrary in the 
constitutional sense is not well defined but 
apparently means deliberate indifference or 
something like the old “shocks the conscience” 
substantive due process standard.
In Lewellen v. Metropolitan Government of 
Nashville and Davidson County, 34 F.3d 345
(6th Cir. 1994), the court stated:
Regardless of whether the result we reached 
in Nishiyama could be justified under
current Supreme Court doctrine, it is clear 
that if Nishiyama had come before us after 
the Supreme Court issued its opinion in 
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, we would 
have had to use a test other than the one
we did use. 34 F.3d 350.
Would the different shades of meaning in the 
different tests (gross negligence v. intentional 
acts or deliberate indifference) lead to a 
different result in Nishiyama today? Good 
arguments can be made on both sides, but 
it is difficult to envision a court leaving the 
Nishiyama family without remedy given the facts
of that case.
6. It is not clear in this case either at the District 
Court or Court of Appeals level whether the 
sheriff and his deputy actually had access to 
Hartman’s records, which apparently indicated 
his prior assault upon a woman.
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